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Abstract Climate change is widely recognised as a ‘wicked’ policy problem. Agree-
ing and implementing governance responses is proving extremely difficult. Policy
makers in many jurisdictions now emphasise their ambition to govern using the best
available evidence. One obvious source of such evidence is the evaluations of the
performance of existing policies. But to what extent do these evaluations provide
insights into the difficult dilemmas that governors typically encounter? We address
this question by reviewing the content of 262 evaluation studies of European climate
policies in the light of six kinds of dilemma found in the governance literature.
We are interested in what these studies say about the performance of European
climate policies and in their capacity to inform evidence-based policy-making. We
find that the evaluations do arrive at common findings: that climate change is
framed as a problem of market and/or state failure; that voluntary measures tend
to be ineffective; that market-based instruments tend to be regressive; that EU-
level policies have driven climate policies in the latecomer EU Member States;
and that lack of monitoring and weak enforcement are major obstacles to effective
policy implementation. However, we also conclude that the evidence base these
studies represent is surprisingly weak for such a high profile area. There is too little
systematic climate policy evaluation work in the EU to support systematic evidence-
C. Haug (B) · D. Huitema · E. Massey · H. van Asselt · F. Berkhout
Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: constanze.haug@ivm.vu.nl
T. Rayner · A. Jordan
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
S. Monni
European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy
R. Hildingsson · J. Stripple
Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
428 Climatic Change (2010) 101:427–445
based policy making. This reduces the scope for sound policy making in the short run
and is a constraint to policy learning in the longer term.
1 Introduction
Climate change is now recognised as the most challenging environmental problem
confronting humanity. This heightened political pressure has fed through to greater
policy making activities in many jurisdictions, but especially the European Union
(EU), which has proclaimed itself a global leader.1 Climate policy, aimed at prevent-
ing dangerous climate change and adapting to a range of impacts now recognised
to be inevitable, has become a high political priority, indeed a raison d’etre, for the
EU. However, governing climate change has proven to be very difficult. Governance,
which we take to be a “purposive” and “goal-oriented” activity (Rosenau 1992,
p. 4), requires policy makers to make difficult choices between alternative courses
of action. These choices are usually made in a context of intense bargaining, which
involves trading off values that may be incommensurate and potentially conflict-
ing. Therefore, policy making often generates dilemmas (see Jordan et al. 2003),
commonly defined as situations requiring selecting between equally unpleasant
alternatives (e.g. Webster’s New World Dictionary). In the context of governing, we
have identified six dilemmas, which can be summarised as follows:
• Problem perception and policy objectives: How to frame the policy problem?
• Levels and scales of governance: At which level (or scale) of governance should
one act?
• Timing and sequencing: How should the balance between a desire for predictabil-
ity and the need for adaptiveness to changing circumstances be struck?
• Modes and instruments of governance: Which modes and instruments of gover-
nance are appropriate and effective?
• Costs and benefits: How should the costs and benefits of policies be distributed,
and should losers be compensated?
• Implementation and enforcement: How should the preferred policy outcomes be
secured?
In its White Paper on governance (CEC 2001), the EU explicitly committed itself to
make choices and navigate dilemmas based as much as possible on evidence. This is
also reflected in its pledge to pursue Better Regulation (Radaelli 2007). Many of the
EU’s Member States have made similar pledges to improve the evidence base of their
governing activities (Nilsson et al. 2008). One potential key source of such evidence
is studies evaluating the performance of previous policies (Weiss 1975, 1979). But to
what extent do evaluations really provide insights and lessons—‘evidence’—on which
to base future policies? This paper addresses this question by looking at the content
of evaluation studies conducted in the area of climate policy. It does so by reporting
on the results of a meta-analysis of 262 climate policy evaluations conducted at the
EU level and in six Member States since 1998. A meta-analysis is a widely accepted
1“We can say to the rest of the world - Europe is taking the lead. You should join us in fighting
climate change”. European Commission President José Manuel Barroso at the Spring Council 8–9
March 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/index_en.htm
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method initially developed in the medical community which aims at identifying
dominant patterns in the results of multiple assessments—or, for us, evaluations—
conducted in a particular policy field (e.g. Glass et al. 1981; Stufflebeam 2001). The
evaluations in our meta-analysis were compiled from database searches, the internet,
and ‘snowballing’ (i.e. asking different producers and users of evaluations—policy
makers, evaluators and so on—for suggestions), in order to cover the widest possible
range of studies. All of them are effectively in the public domain.
Our analysis is framed around the six governance dilemmas identified above.2
These dilemmas, we contend, should be adequately addressed in the evaluation
studies if the latter are to serve as a valuable basis for policy making. We analyse
the lessons—both for policy making and for future academic research—that flow
from the patterns we observe. To be clear, our analysis limits itself to discussing the
substantive content of the evaluations; we do not investigate the extent to which
policy makers ‘learned’ from their conclusions. These are important questions that
lie outside the scope of this article.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section
describes the methodology of the meta-analysis and the justification for choosing
the seven case jurisdictions. Subsequently, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 discuss how
the six governance dilemmas noted above were addressed in the 262 climate policy
evaluations. Section 9 draws the different strands of the paper together, summarises
the key findings and discusses the implications for future evaluation practice.
2 Methodology
Our extensive (although not exhaustive) research uncovered a long list of evaluations
conducted since 1998. From this list, we identified studies that offered a systematic
assessment of policies already in place (ex post evaluations), and excluded those that
were either not sufficiently systematic (such as position papers by lobby groups) or
that were wholly ex ante. Policies were classified as ‘climate change’ policies if they
were reported as such in respective National Communications to the Secretariat of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).3 This
process resulted in a final dataset of 262 evaluation studies. The content and focus of
each evaluation was coded according to a template comprising ten main criteria and
50 sub-criteria.4 One important consequence of our decision to concentrate on ex-
post evaluations was a strong bias in our sample towards mitigation, with only seven
2For a similar list to the one presented here, see Bennett (1991). For an application to the politics of
climate change, see Kok et al. (2002).
3All Parties to the UNFCCC are required to periodically submit National Communications to the
UNFCCC Secretariat which contain information on emissions and removals of greenhouse gases in
that country and on the activities the Party has undertaken to implement the Convention.
4The dataset is available at www.adamproject.eu. The cut-off date for our evaluations was March
2007. The main criteria ranged from the affiliation of the author(s) and main sector(s) addressed,
to whether the evaluation was “technical-analytical” (accepting official policy goals as a given) or
“discursive” (prepared to question official policy goals). In this way, we were able to develop an
overview of the overall practice of climate policy evaluation in Europe (Huitema et al. 2008). The
sub-criteria were derived from the six governance dilemmas.
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studies covering adaptation policies. This lack of attention in evaluations is not sur-
prising, given that adaptation policies remain at such an early stage of development
(Massey and Bergsma 2008).
Our sample of evaluations includes studies evaluating climate policies of the EU
as a whole and of six of its Member States. In choosing these states we sought to
reflect the social, political, economic, and geographical diversity of Europe (Fig. 1).
We included two large northern European countries, the UK and Germany, both of
which have tended to be drivers of the EU climate change policy agenda (Jordan
and Liefferink 2004), have robust economies, and display a relatively high degree of
public involvement in policy making. Two southern European countries, Portugal
and Italy, are also covered by the analysis. While differing in size and economic
conditions, they have similar geographic characteristics. Both can be characterized
as ‘followers’ in the sphere of environmental policy agenda-setting and have seen
less public debate about climate change (ibid). Finland, a small, rich and socially-
progressive country represents the Scandinavian perspective and Poland represents
the bloc of post-2004 Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, given
the increasing importance of EU-level action, we also included evaluations covering
the EU as a whole.
It is perhaps not surprising that in a multi-levelled, differentiated political space
like the EU, the total evaluation effort is rather unevenly spread (see Fig. 1). The
EU 
level
106 
78
54
27
  12
6
10 
Fig. 1 EU Member States covered by the meta-analysis and number of evaluations retrieved per
jurisdiction. Note for this graph, and also for Fig. 2 that reports were counted multiple times when
they covered more than one case jurisdiction or applied more than one evaluation criterion
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bulk of the 262 evaluation studies that we were able to retrieve address climate policy
in the UK (78 studies), Germany (54) and at the EU level (106 studies). By contrast,
for Portugal and Poland we found only ten and six studies respectively, many of them
prompted by EU directive reporting requirements. Finally, the majority (58%) of the
evaluations in our sample had not been commissioned by a government institution,
suggesting a certain level of independence of the evaluators. Among the studies that
were commissioned, 59% were solicited by governmental bodies (see Huitema et al.
2008). The following sections discuss how the evaluation studies address each of the
six governance dilemmas identified above.
3 Problem perception and policy objectives
Problem perceptions and framing are fundamental to the handling of a policy
problem (Majone 1989; Schön and Rein 1994). How a problem is perceived by gov-
ernments and the public at large shapes decisions over whether policy is developed
at all, what instruments are employed, when action is taken, at what administrative
level that action is focused, and what financial and human resources will be devoted
to it.
Few studies in our dataset address this dilemma explicitly—most stay close to what
one might term the official climate policy discourse in the EU. Thus, almost all the
studies we reviewed emphasise the urgency with which measures to cut greenhouse
gas emissions need to be taken. A number of them support a higher degree of
ambition with regard to the emission reduction targets that the EU and its Member
States have set for themselves, including a stronger link of these objectives to the
EU’s 2◦C target (e.g. FoEE 2005; Lechtenböhmer et al. 2005). Yet these criticisms
relate more to ‘tweaking’ existing commitments than calling for a radical change
in direction. Indeed, only 18% of the evaluations can be considered as ‘discursive’
or ‘reflexive’, by which we mean questioning the dominant framings of the climate
problem—all the more surprising given the high number of independently conducted
evaluation studies, as discussed above.
Two further themes emerge from the evaluations with regard to problem percep-
tion: the framing of climate change as a market failure and/or state failure, and the
degree to which climate policy to date has been the product of a ‘co-benefits’ strategy.
In the evaluations reviewed, the underlying diagnosis of the climate change problem
is that it derives from a combination of market failure—the inadequate allocation
of property rights and/or prevalence of unpriced external costs—and what might be
labelled state failure—the lack of effort made to integrate environmental consider-
ations into the day-to-day working of government. Hence, the strong implication of
the bulk of evaluations is that climate change can in principle be adequately dealt
with, even in the context of a continually growing economy, provided appropriate
measures are taken to correct such failures (e.g. SRU 2004; Lechtenböhmer et al.
2005; Egenhofer et al. 2006b).
Framing the problem in this way leads to the promotion of market-based instru-
ments to incorporate the wider ‘social cost of carbon’ (e.g. WBBWA 2004; OECD
2002b). The removal of perverse incentives in the form of subsidies to polluting
activities, such as coal mining, is more prominent as a recommendation in many
evaluations (e.g. SRU 2000; OECD 2001; Michaelowa 2003) than in everyday policy
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practice. Evaluations also note that several long-standing measures reported as
climate policies were initially designed as responses to other problems.5 Evaluation
studies vary in the extent to which they seek to quantify these co-benefits, but it is
reported that their existence has helped policy makers in securing support for key
policies (e.g. Szarka and Blühdorn 2006).
We conclude that climate policy evaluations do not, in general, challenge domi-
nant framings of the policy problem as one of market and state failure with regard to
greenhouse gas emissions. Only a small number of the more discursive studies argue
that more radical problem framings are needed—such as a mitigation approach based
on personal carbon budgets. The conservatism of most evaluations serves to further
embed a dominant framing of the climate problem and the policy responses to it—
reducing emissions by pricing climate damages and implementing policy integration
(Kuik et al. 2008). However, evaluations also acknowledge that there are often
political obstacles to policy formation, and show that (unquantified) claims to co-
benefits have frequently been necessary to justify policy action.
4 Levels and scales of governance
In the EU, the question of the appropriate level of policy action has been a
foundational issue, especially sharply focused since the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ (that
matters should be dealt with by the lowest or least centralised competent authority)
entered into EU policy discourses in the early 1990s (Jordan 2000). The essential
governance dilemma here is that, left to their own devices, Member States may not
make sufficient headway to ensure that the EU meets its collective commitments;
however, too much central steering could entail unacceptably high costs, turn out
to be ineffective and meet strong political resistance from states concerned about
economic competitiveness, as well as about losing their competence to the EU.
Questions regarding the relationship between the European dimension of policy
making and national action are addressed in almost half (49%) of the evaluations we
reviewed. Interestingly, none of the studies refer to negative interactions between
climate policies at the EU and Member States levels, although Agnolucci (2006),
for example, notes how uncertainty over a draft EU directive stifled renewables
growth in Germany for a period.6 On the contrary, evaluators’ support for greater
5For example, the first renewables support programmes in the 1970s were adopted largely as a
response to the oil crisis and resulting security of supply concerns (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006).
Equally, pollution standards for both stationary and mobile sources across the Community were in
many cases imposed mainly with the primary purpose to tackle local air pollution, with reduced
greenhouse gas emissions as a welcome side-effect (e.g. OECD 2003).
6The ETS has also given rise to concerns that it would effectively make redundant significant parts
of national climate change programmes (Sorrell and Sijm 2003). It is possible that the reason such
clashes are not being identified is that evaluators are choosing not to address this issue. Interestingly,
however, where one potential clash was identified—between the ETS and the Declaration by
German Industry on Global Warming Prevention—the incompatibility was resolved by partly basing
the first National Allocation Plan on the targets adopted in the declaration.
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harmonisation at the EU level appeared strong across our dataset, especially with
regard to the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) and carbon taxation.
The initial design of the EU ETS in 2003 left many important decisions to the
discretion of Member States, including the determination of the total quantity
of allowances to allocate, and the distribution of allowances between sectors and
installations (Grubb et al. 2005). These issues were to some extent addressed in the
2008 revision of the Emissions Trading Directive (2008/101/EC).
Another area considered a candidate for increased harmonisation by a number
of evaluations was energy policy, more specifically taxation and the promotion
of renewables. Although efforts to introduce a European-level carbon tax failed
in the early 1990s, calls for harmonisation are still a recurrent theme in policy
evaluations (Prime Minister’s Office, Economic Council 2000; Interwies et al. 2002).
For the most part, however, they remain at a fairly general level, emphasising the
economic efficiency advantages of a uniform European tax over a patchwork of
national schemes, while acknowledging the political obstacles to tax harmonisation,
and without going into much detail regarding design and implementation.
Perhaps most interesting are the findings regarding the relationship between the
EU’s climate measures—so-called Common and Co-ordinated Policies and Mea-
sures (CCPMs)—and those of its Member States. At issue here is how a balance
is struck between the need for coordination and the desire for flexibility at the
national and local level. Relatively few studies (seven in total) considered the relation
between CCPMs and national policies. Most of these were either commissioned or
written by the European Commission and/or the European Environmental Agency.
One of the reasons for this relative scarcity may be that Member State evaluation
studies do not refer to CCPMs directly, even though national policy often finds its
origin in these coordinated policies. The studies that do highlight the relationship
assert that CCPMs often work as drivers for national mitigation action, especially in
cases where the Member State has not been active in the field before (e.g. Golder
Europe EEIG 2005; EEA 2006; CEC 2007a). The quantitative targets of many
CCPMs, as well as the reporting obligation, support their effectiveness—even if
not all Member States comply fully with the targets set. With regard to national
policies of the European ‘leaders’, there is little evidence in the evaluations that
‘Europeanisation’ has hindered or reduced the innovativeness or effectiveness of
national action.
In sum., a majority of evaluation studies in our sample provide evidence that the
harmonisation of climate policies at EU level is beneficial. Calls for more centralised
steering refer most often to the EU ETS and to aspects of energy policies, especially
taxation and renewables promotion. The studies also demonstrate the benefits of
CCPMs as effective means to diffuse climate policies to ‘laggard’ Member States
while not limiting the freedom of ‘leader’ countries to implement more ambitious
policies.
5 Timing and sequencing
The timing and sequencing dilemma encompasses a range of questions, concerning
whether to act early or postpone action, the timescale over which policy should
be introduced, and the dangers of becoming ‘locked in’ to inappropriate policy
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pathways (Pierson 2000). In an area like climate policy that is characterised by long
time horizons and great uncertainty over potential costs and benefits of different
courses of action, some reflections on the merits of flexible ‘adaptive governance’
(e.g. Huitema et al. 2009) against long-term regulatory stability might be expected to
show up in policy evaluations.
Overall, the attention given to the timing and sequencing dilemma was most
explicit in the evaluations addressing two policy domains: the EU ETS and the
diffusion of renewables. Concerning the EU ETS, the dilemma is most salient
with regard to the length of the trading periods. Several evaluations considered
their relatively short duration (5 years in the period up to 2012, and 7 years after
that) a significant drawback (Egenhofer et al. 2006a). The ability of Member State
governments to go ‘back to the drawing board’ prior to each new allocation period
implies that certainty can only be provided for up to five years ahead (ibid). Longer
trading periods would provide greater predictability, reducing investment risks.
With respect to renewable energy, the evaluations in our data set identified
continuous political support and policy stability as key conditions for enabling growth
and diffusion (CEC 2005). Moreover, the design of the mechanism chosen for the
promotion of renewables, in particular its influence on the level of risk for renewable
energy investors, emerged as crucial (CEC 2005; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). Based
on the evaluations we reviewed, feed-in laws to stimulate renewable energy sources
(used for example in Germany and Portugal) seem to have fared better in this
regard than green certificate schemes (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2006; Szarka and Blühdorn
2006). The greater investment certainty under a feed-in scheme stems from the fact
that the price paid for renewable energy is stable: producers bear no ‘volume risk’
because network distributors are required to accept all generated green energy. By
contrast, under a certificate scheme (such as the Renewables Obligation in the UK),
the value of the certificates is much less predictable since it depends on supply and
demand in the market (Mitchell et al. 2006). This additional economic uncertainty
on top of other technical and regulatory uncertainties is widely perceived as a critical
obstacle to renewable investments, borne out by the much more rapid expansion of
renewables in countries with feed-in tariffs.
The available evaluation studies also suggest that there need not necessarily be
a trade-off between predictability and adaptiveness in renewables policy, provided
that the support mechanism in place is well designed. The German system of feed-in
tariffs, for instance, while creating a more stable investment climate than the UK’s
tradable green certificates system, also seems to be more flexible, due to regular
reviews built into the instrument (Szarka and Blühdorn 2006).
To conclude, the evaluations in our sample tend to confirm the ‘early action’
mitigation strategy which, at least rhetorically, has been at the core of the EU’s
political position on climate change since the late 1980s. Timing and sequencing
considerations have influenced policy design especially in debates about the EU
ETS and renewable policy, both of which have sought to balance predictability of
a policy against its adaptiveness. On renewables, the German experience suggests
that an emphasis on predictability need not compromise flexibility. In the case of the
ETS, the main concern has been with the length of allocation periods. However, this
may have become less pressing as the general political commitment to climate policy
has grown within the EU since 2005, thereby reassuring would-be investors of the
economic wisdom of investing in emissions reductions.
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6 Modes and instruments
A recurrent dilemma in environmental policy making is how far to rely on hierar-
chical, market or network-based modes and instruments of governance respectively
(Jordan et al. 2003). The main challenge confronting policy makers is how to choose
modes (and their associated policy instruments) in a way that maximises their
strengths and reduces their weaknesses. This implies dilemmas related to how to
strike the balance between hierarchical authority and market autonomy in policy
design.
Across our dataset, considerable attention was dedicated to the evaluation of
voluntary agreements (Table 1). Studies tend to agree that voluntary action such
as the Declaration of German Industry on Global Warming Prevention, an example
of a unilateral industrial commitment at least in its initial versions, has largely failed
in stimulating significant emission cuts. In the German case, many of the targets have
been set close to business-as-usual projections, implying that most reductions would
have taken place irrespective of the declaration (Krarup and Ramesohl 2000; SRU
2000; RWI 2000). Similar findings apply for the UK Climate Change Agreements
(CCAs) from 2001. Despite showing a high degree of participation, the effectiveness
of the agreements is contested by a number of studies (e.g. EAC 2004; Glachant and
de Muizon 2007). Most sectors exceeded their quantitative targets for 2010 well in
advance of the official deadline, without requiring special effort (FES 2005).
More positive conclusions on the effectiveness of voluntary agreements can
be drawn from the Finnish experience. Based on the studies we reviewed, the
Finnish Energy Conservation Agreement scheme seems to demonstrate that (public)
voluntary programmes can be successful in stimulating participation and energy
saving measures, provided they are accompanied by proper incentives (in this case
government subsidies for energy auditing and energy saving investments) (Heikkilä
et al. 2005; Pöllänen and Kalenoja 2005). The energy and climate objectives of the
programme are projected to be exceeded (Motiva 2006). However, the schemes seem
mainly to collect ‘low hanging fruits’; most implemented measures have a relatively
short payback time (Khan 2006).
In sum, the meta-analysis confirmed the widely-held view that voluntary agree-
ments are unable to bring about far-reaching changes in behaviour by firms and
sectors. Most studies explain the disappointing performance of voluntary agreements
by citing unambitious targets and the lack of incentives for participation and compli-
ance mechanisms. Finally, hardly any evaluations have attempted comparisons be-
Table 1 Frequently evaluated voluntary agreements
Type of voluntary agreement Example of voluntary agreements assessed
Unilateral agreements by industrial firms Declaration of German Industry on
(i.e. self-commitment) Global Warming (DGWP)
Public voluntary schemes Finnish Energy Conservation Agreement
Scheme (incl. Energy Audit Programme)
Negotiated agreements UK Climate Change Agreements (CCAs);
ACEA-JAMA-KAMA (car manufacturing)
covenants
Typology based on Börkey and Lévèque (1998)
436 Climatic Change (2010) 101:427–445
tween different instruments, an unexpected omission given that the choice between
instruments typically generates significant policy dilemmas in the governance process
(Linder and Peters 1989).
7 Costs and benefits
When deciding when, at which level, and by what means to act, policy makers also
have to weigh the associated costs and benefits. Although policy interventions may
seek to generate net social benefits, they inevitably generate winners and losers
(Bennett 1991). The most important governance dilemma in this context is what
costs and benefits to take into account and whether any losers will be compensated.
Judgements on these issues are tied to considerations about policy effectiveness,
fairness, legitimacy and the relative power of affected parties.
The issue of distributive equity in climate policy is not widely covered in the
evaluation studies we reviewed. Only a small number used fairness (which we take
to mean equity in the sharing of costs and benefits between actors) as an evaluation
criterion (see Fig. 2). This lack of attention may, if Weidner (2005) is correct, reflect
a degree of political expediency, whereby governments prefer not to highlight the
regressive nature of many of their policies.
Amongst our sample of six Member States, official UK evaluations did the most
to record the distribution of costs and benefits, recording how they affected three
groups: the Treasury, firms and consumers. Yet judgments about where the burden
Fig. 2 Criteria used in the evaluations
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ultimately falls are complicated by uncertainty over the extent to which additional
costs incurred by firms are passed on to consumers. Economic models suggest that
this is likely to be the case for between 50% and 100% of any cost increases,
depending on the competitiveness constraints faced by businesses (DEFRA 2006).
Where distributional and equity concerns are prominently discussed is in the
growing number of evaluations of the consequences (particularly for households)
of carbon-energy taxation and EU emissions trading. The reason for this greater
attention appears to be that while the costs associated with established regulatory
instruments tend to remain hidden from the general public, potential changes to the
status quo following the introduction of new carbon taxes and emissions trading are
more politically controversial (see Bressers and Huitema 1999).
Along with competitiveness concerns, the distributional implications of carbon
taxes are a major issue in determining their political acceptability. Evidence from
the evaluations suggests that carbon taxes may be mildly regressive (because lower
income groups spend proportionately more of their income on energy-related expen-
ditures), but this often depends on the modelling framework used (e.g. Tiezzi 2005).
However, this regressive effect can be greatly reduced, or even reversed, where the
tax is applied in a revenue-neutral context. This varies across Member States. Symons
et al. (2002) find that while energy or CO2 taxation is regressive in Finland, Germany,
France and, to a lesser degree, in Spain, it is progressive in the UK (except for
the highest income group) and neutral in Italy. Moreover, regional distributions are
uneven, with households in rural areas being disproportionately affected (Mustonen
and Sinko 2000).
In handling the revenues from carbon taxation, a key trade-off emerges between
efficiency and equity. Interestingly, this dilemma is treated differently in different
Member States. Where a part of the revenues is used to compensate poorer house-
holds suffering from an increased tax burden, the scope for the revenues to be used
to maximise the efficiency gains from reductions in other existing distortionary taxes,
for example Value Added Tax (VAT), will be lost. In Germany, for example, the
ecological tax reform recycled tax revenues by cutting employers’ and employees’
social security contributions in equal measure, showing less concern “with fiscal
orthodoxy and more with political appeal” (Andersen et al. 2007, p. 523).
Debates about efficiency (the functioning of the market and its ability to achieve
environmental benefits) and equity (redistribution of wealth) have also been promi-
nent in the context of the evaluations of the EU ETS. The generous allocation of
emissions allowances to installations covered by the scheme has shifted the burden
for achieving Europe’s Kyoto targets to the non-emissions trading sectors (Rogge
et al. 2006).7 Moreover, the ETS has led to an increase in electricity prices in
the EU (Sijm et al. 2006), with power producers able to pass on costs to their
customers, both industrial and household, giving them windfall profits. This could
have adverse consequences for industries falling both within and outside the scope
7The EU ETS covers large emitters in the power and heat generation industry and in selected energy-
intensive industrial sectors. Key emitters outside the EU ETS are the transport and domestic sectors.
For the period 2012–2020, however, the burden sharing between the sectors has changed—under the
new EU climate and energy package, the EU ETS is expected to reduce emissions by 21% by 2020
compared to a 2005 baseline, the other sectors by 10% (COM (2008)30).
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of the ETS (see e.g. Egenhofer et al. 2005; Sijm et al. 2006; Neuhoff et al. 2006;
Legambiente 2007).
In summary, the degree to which explicit attention is dedicated to the costs
and benefits of governing (here narrowly interpreted as distributive equity) varies
across our dataset of evaluations. Equity is examined most thoroughly with regard to
the EU ETS and carbon taxation, highly visible and relatively controversial policy
instruments. The evaluation studies in our sample indicate that effective climate
policies involving carbon taxation tend to be mildly regressive, but the different
experiences across countries suggest this is by no means inevitable. In the case
of the ETS, certain powerful sectors of industry appear to be able to pass the
burden of emission reductions to politically less influential groups, namely household
consumers.
8 Implementation and enforcement
Implementation is the part of the policy process in which the chosen instruments
are applied to a target group, their response monitored, and any deviations from the
expected outcome responded to. The key dilemma here relates to whether provisions
should exist for sanctions against non-compliance and what level of monitoring and
enforcement is desirable.
The vast majority of the evaluations we reviewed (roughly 67%) devoted consid-
erable attention to the state of implementation and enforcement of climate policies.
Overall, the idea of an ‘implementation gap’ in EU environmental policy (Jordan
1999), long prominent in European policy circles, is reinforced. Thus, a number
of EU-level evaluations express concern at the incomplete implementation of the
measures outlined in the European Climate Change Programme (CEC 2006a)—
referring, variously, to the chain of procedures including political adoption of the
proposed policies by EU institutions, transposition into Member State law, enforce-
ment by national authorities, and recourse to European-level sanctions in case of
non-compliance (e.g. CEC 2006b, c, 2007b).
Three further themes relating to implementation and enforcement emerge from
the meta-analysis: loopholes in the design of some instruments; poor provisions
made for monitoring; and the weakness or indeed lack of enforcement mechanisms
for many policies. Starting with the first of these, many evaluations demonstrate
that policy instruments that were initially designed with some degree of ambition
are watered down before their implementation. The reason for such last-minute
modification is often the same: the need to secure support from influential lobbies
that would otherwise block the policy from being adopted. The many special rules
and exemptions from energy taxation, for instance in Italy and in Germany, are one
example for this (OECD 2002a; Böhringer and Schwager 2003).
Moving on to monitoring, ex-ante and ex-post measurements of the performance
of policy instruments are undoubtedly a precondition to establishing their effective-
ness and for learning from implementation experience (Sabatier 1986). Thus, one
particularly striking theme to emerge from the meta-analysis was the widespread
condemnation of the poor provision for monitoring that characterises many policy
instruments (e.g. EAC 2005b; Maslin et al. 2007; RWI 2000). In their attempts to
evaluate the effectiveness of 20 energy efficiency policies, Ecofys et al. (2007) were
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hampered by the fact that most instruments lacked a comprehensive monitoring
system. Even though methodologies are widely known, both the availability and
quality of monitoring data for the impacts of specific policy instruments turned out
to be much lower than expected.8 To take the example of the ETS, lack of reliable
ex-ante data at the installation level was a source of difficulties in determining the
cap and distribution of allowances in the first phase of the EU ETS (Ellerman and
Buchner 2006).
A broader issue that is frequently raised in the evaluations in our sample is the
lack of early-warning mechanisms to inform policy makers about whether policies
will deliver the intended results. On this question, it is instructive to note that even
in a country with a relatively mature climate policy such as the UK, a leading
watchdog criticized the time taken by the government to acknowledge that the
policy was “so far off course” (EAC 2005a, p. 40) from its 2010 targets, due to
inadequate monitoring. On top of this, policymakers are faced with the possibility
that apparent successes may in fact be less significant than supposed, owing to
‘rebound effects’, i.e. energy savings due to efficiency improvements being offset by
increased consumption (DEFRA 2006; Maslin et al. 2007). Evaluations in our sample
often acknowledged the need for more sophisticated monitoring of such effects and
treatment in calculations of emission reductions obtained (e.g. FES and PSI 2005).
Another frequently highlighted concern is the paucity of enforcement mechanisms
(e.g. IPA Energy and Water Consulting 2007; SRU 2005; Maslin et al. 2007). This is
particularly pertinent in the case of voluntary agreements (RWI 2000), but also in
green certificate schemes, Poland being one example (CEC 2007b). Furthermore,
non-compliance is a cause of concern in the building sector, where energy standards
for new buildings are often poorly enforced (see e.g. Maslin et al. 2007; Oxera 2005),
apparently due to concerns over the impact on property developers.
In conclusion, the most striking theme to emerge from the meta-analysis is the
generally poor provision made for monitoring that characterizes many policy instru-
ments. Many evaluations conclude with strong recommendations that future policies
be fully implemented and equipped with adequate monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed the potential stock of usable evidence on the
evolution and performance of European climate policies, based on a meta-analysis of
262 evaluation studies. Our analysis was organised around six governance dilemmas
that policy makers commonly encounter when developing new policy interventions
or when deciding how to improve existing ones. In a broad sense, the evidence the
evaluations generate is quite extensive. For example, all six governance dilemmas
were addressed in the evaluations we reviewed. However, they did not engage with
all dilemmas to the same extent.
The issue of problem perception, for example, was certainly much more implicit
in the studies than the other dilemmas. Evaluators for the most part seem to accept
8This report was not included in our sample of evaluations since it was published after the cut-off
date for the meta-analysis (March 2007).
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the problem framings inherent to the policy measures they are evaluating. Levels
and scale dilemmas were analysed at length in only a relatively small number of
evaluations, suggesting either consensus about the proper roles for European and
national action, or the need for more debate. With regard to timing and sequencing,
the evaluations in our database addressed the predictability of policy measures, while
neglecting the critical issue of the sequencing of policies. On the selection of modes
and instruments of governance, in many of the evaluations we noted a preference
for more regulatory modes of governance, mainly in response to the perceived
difficulty of adopting fiscal measures and the apparent ineffectiveness of voluntary
approaches. Given the political prominence of the EU’s focus on Better Regulation,
regulatory simplification and lessening regulatory burdens, we expected to find
many more explicit cost–benefit analyses of policy instruments. Yet, only 4% of the
studies reviewed were based on cost–benefit analyses or related methodologies. The
discussions of distributive equity were largely limited to the impacts of two highly
visible policy instruments: taxes and emissions trading. Finally, issues to do with
implementation and enforcement were the focus of a large part of the evaluations,
which identified loopholes in many policies and criticized poor monitoring of many
policy instruments.
Given this broad—but uneven—spread, do existing evaluations allow us to draw
firm conclusions regarding the effectiveness of European climate policies? Although
the majority of the evaluation studies we reviewed were concerned with the effec-
tiveness (or goal attainment) of policies (see Fig. 2), few clear-cut lessons emerge.
In part, this is related to the limited amount of quantitative assessment in current
climate policy evaluation: most of the studies in our sample did not contain an explicit
‘tonnes per policy’ analysis of the contribution of specific policies to attaining the goal
of emissions reduction. Such quantification was most common in UK assessments
(included in roughly a third of the UK studies), but much less common in the other
jurisdictions. Even where such assessments were included, a variety of techniques
was used, often generating divergent results. The span of opinion on the effectiveness
of European climate policy ranges from Eichhammer et al. (2001, p. 1), who assert
that in the UK and Germany, “a mix of policies at the national and regional levels
added considerably to the reduction of greenhouse gases”, to Kerr (2007), who
argues that there is no statistically significant data to show that climate policies have
produced an effect.
The relatively small number of ‘tonnes per policy’ assessments and the variability
of the results could have a number of causes. Often no baseline scenario for emissions
was established before a policy was initiated. This makes it difficult to construct the
counter-factual, i.e. what would have happened in the absence of a policy measure. A
further problem is that quantitative data on emissions and other ‘non-policy’ factors
that might explain changes may not be available yet because monitoring programmes
have not been in place long enough. Besides these problems, which might be
termed operational, there is also the analytical problem of attribution. Emissions
are continually and dynamically influenced by a wide range of economic, technical
and other factors. There will also be a range of policy measures that influence them,
directly or indirectly. European policies to create competitive and liberalised energy
markets have had a clear downward impact on energy prices, which would tend to
lead to increased consumption and, assuming a static energy supply system, rising
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greenhouse gas emissions. EU and Member State climate policies seek to produce
the opposite effect.
But such policy interactions also occur between different climate policies, both
within and between European jurisdictions. Climate policies are often framed as
policy packages (the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package continues this pattern).
Separating the signal of these packages of measures, let alone that of an individual
policy, from the ‘noise’ of the many other factors that influence emissions remains
an extremely difficult exercise. This is especially the case if the data to conduct a
good decomposition analysis, a baseline to use as a counter-factual, does not exist.
We remain sceptical about whether it will ever be possible to produce an analysis
of the performance of climate policy measures that wins universal agreement. After
all, evaluation is, “. . . an activity which is knee deep in values, beliefs, party politics
and ideology, and this makes proving that this policy had this or that impact a notion
which is deeply suspect” (Parsons 1995, p. 550).
By examining the content of 262 climate policy evaluations, this paper has,
however, generated a far better survey of the ‘supply side’ of evaluation—the stock of
potentially usable evidence available to policy makers—than appears in the existing
literature. Yet, even if the coverage and quality of evaluations was adequate (and as
discussed above, this is unfortunately not the case so far in the EU), their impact
on policy making is, the literature also informs us, still far from assured (Weiss
1975; Nilsson et al. 2008). Producing good evaluations is one thing, but getting
policy makers to draw upon them is something altogether different. Future research
could therefore benefit from more focus on the interface between evaluation and its
uptake in policy making, thus moving closer to the ‘demand side’ of climate policy
evaluation. Some related questions are explored in a companion paper (Huitema
et al. 2008), which discusses trends in current evaluation practice in Europe based
on the same dataset as the present analysis. Yet further investigation into possible
mismatches between the ‘supply’ and the ‘demand side’ and the question of how
policy makers can learn from the evidence provided by policy evaluations is definitely
warranted (Nilsson et al. 2008; Nutley et al. 2007).
Be that as it may, with the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package, EU climate
policy arguably entered a new and more vigorous phase. If the EU wants to continue
its global political leadership in the climate arena it needs to demonstrate that it
can bring down its greenhouse gas emissions while securing economic welfare for
European industries and citizens. Knowing whether and how climate policies work is
essential to achieving these goals. At present we know too little about how European
and Member State policies influence greenhouse emissions, to a large extent because
the evidence base for conducting good policy evaluations is lacking. There is an
urgent need for a more uniform framework for evaluating climate policies (singly
and as packages) ex-ante, to collect data relevant to ex-post evaluations and to permit
independent bodies to conduct such evaluations at regular intervals. Armed with this
information, policy makers would be in a better position to re-design existing policies
both ‘smartly’ (Gunningham and Gabrosky 1998) and adaptively.
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